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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has shown that financial shocks can have important
macroeconomic effects. Contemporary macroeconomic models now routinely include
“financial frictions” and “financial shocks” to explain how economic fluctuations are
generated and propagated. This increased focus on financial variables has shown that
financial constraints and worsening credit conditions faced by firms during recessions
are extremely important to explain aggregate labor market variables, such as
employment and unemployment. Two recent examples of this work are Jermann and
Quadrini (2012) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2015), who use Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibirium (DSGE) models to study the macroeconomic effects of
the financial shock that led into the Great Recession in the US, and find that the
tightening of financial conditions faced by firms plays the main role in explaining the
deterioration of economic activity and of employment.1
Complementing the evidence stemming from DSGE models, economic theory provides
plausible mechanisms that explain the connection between credit constrained firms,
employment, and unemployment. For example, Petrosky-Nadeau (2014) shows how the
easing of financing constraints generates job creation in a standard
search-and-matching model of equilibrium unemployment in which firms require
external financing to post vacancies. Chugh (2013) shows that a model in which firms
require working capital to finance their operating costs, when calibrated to the cyclical
nature of financial conditions, generates large fluctuations of labor market quantities.2
In this paper, we complement the existing theoretical literature by empirically
measuring how easing credit constraints affects aggregate employment variables in a
recessionary environment.
Our specific question is if—and how—a sudden and unexpected liquidity injection to the
1The Great Recession gave rise to an explosion in the number of papers studying financial shocks and
their effects on economic fluctuations, both within and outside the DSGE tradition. Because of their
sheer number we cannot possibly do justice to all of them. A necessarily arbitrary sample of recent
papers on this topic includes Bassetto, Cagetti, and De Nardi (2015), Beck, Colciago, and Pfajfar
(2014), Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014), Liu and Minford (2014), and Meeks (2012). The
main takeaway from these papers is that financial frictions and financial shocks matter for economic
fluctuations. Considering a longer time frame, Schularick and Taylor (2012) show that credit growth
has been a powerful predictor of financial crises in the period 1870–2008 and that these crises have had
sizable output costs.
2Wasmer and Weil (2004) prove, in general, that in a model with endogenous search in credit and
labor markets, credit frictions amplify macroeconomic volatility through a financial accelerator.
2
non-financial private sector affects aggregate employment. To answer this question we
use Spain in the Great Recession as our laboratory. In early 2012, the Spanish central
government announced that it would pay all invoices in arrears owed by sub-national
governments at the regional and municipality level. This program was large (it amounted
to almost 3% of Spanish GDP), and unexpected: it was first mentioned in the press in
January 2012.
Municipalities were exposed to the liquidity shock to a different degree. We therefore
identify the effect of the liquidity shock on employment from the cross-sectional variation
in municipal employment data by comparing municipalities that received a high liquidity
shock to those that received a low liquidity shock and how they fared before and after
2012. We track the evolution of employment over a window of two years prior to and
after the shock, i.e., from 2010 to 2014. To take into account potential selection bias due
to the heterogeneity of the size of liquidity shocks across municipalities we use a sample
where we match on covariates.
2 Relationship with previous literature
Delgado Te´llez, Herna´ndez de Cos, Hurtado, and Pe´rez (2015) studied the impact of
the repayment of sub-national debt in arrears in Spain from an aggregate perspective.
They use total payments made to cancel commercial debt by municipalities and regional
governments and construct a quarterly time series of payments from the public sector
to the private sector. In a first exercise they estimate a VAR specification and find that
the reduction of commercial arrears is associated with a cumulative GDP growth of 0.55
percentage points over the period 2012–2014. In a second exercise they use the Quarterly
Model of Banco de Espan˜a (MTBE, Modelo Trimestral del Banco de Espan˜a), a large-
scale macro-econometric model used for medium term macroeconomic forecasting of the
Spanish economy. They find that repayment of commercial debt in arrears could account
for growth in GDP on the level of between 0.3 and 0.6 cumulative percentage points over
the period 2012–2014, depending on the degree to which the shock was anticipated. GDP
growth in the model is explained mainly through a rise in household consumption and
private investment. They also report the estimated effect on employment growth and
put that figure between 0.4 and 0.7 percentage points (cumulatively over the period
2012–2014).
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Other prior research has also shown a connection between financial constraints and the
labor market. In a cross-country study, Borsi (2015) finds that private credit contractions
have a sizable impact on the unemployment rate in OECD countries, in particular in the
first two years after a disruption of credit markets. Kannan (2012) finds that stressed
credit conditions constrain the pace of recovery after a recession. For the case of Spain,
Bentolila, Jansen, Jime´nez, and Ruano (2013) use Spanish firm-level data to argue that
the weakest banks during the Great Recession caused a reduction in credit supply, and
also on employment. Our paper complements their findings by studying liquidity that
is not provided by the financial sector.
In related research, Bru¨ckner and Tuladhar (2014) estimate local government spending
multipliers using annual data for 47 Japanese prefectures during a financial crisis in
the 1990s. They break down government spending into different categories and find
that transfers to firms in the form of credit guarantees for small and medium-sized
enterprises provide the strongest effect on output. Their findings also suggest a positive
effect on the labor market: they find that government transfers to firms also have a
significant positive effect on employment and hours worked. Their identification relies
on within-prefecture variation in government expenditures and uses a system-GMM
estimation with lagged variables to mitigate endogeneity arising from reverse causality.
In contrast, our identification strategy exploits the unexpectedness and differential size
of the liquidity shock.
Other research related to ours is that of Corbi, Papaioannou, and Surico (2014), who
use a ‘fuzzy’ regression discontinuity design to study the effect of federal transfers on
local economic activity in Brazilian municipalities. Using local GDP measures as their
outcome variable, they find that transfers from the federal government tend to be more
stimulative in regions with a lower penetration of bank branches, which they interpret
as a proxy for tighter financial constraints. Although the lifting of financial constraints
was not the main focus, several studies have studied a related question of how stimulus
spending from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) affected US
employment using subnational geographic regions. Wilson (2012) provides an example
of this kind of work.
Turning to firm-level data, Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes (2011) studied a tax holiday
for the repatriation of foreign earnings which they interpreted as an alleviation of
financial constraints. In their sample covering multinational companies they did not
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find any impact on employment.
3 Spain in the Great Recession: context and
institutional detail
The Great Recession took a heavy toll on the Spanish labor market and, as argued by
Campos and Reggio (2015), the unemployment rate may have fed back into domestic
demand through its effect on consumption. According to Pissarides (2013), the rise in
unemployment in Spain was an outlier when compared to other OECD countries. It
is exceptionally high when compared to the group of similar crisis-hit countries in the
periphery of the Eurozone (Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain). The two main
explanations that have been put forward for the surge in Spain’s unemployment rate are
the country’s two-tier labor market (Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado, and Barbanchon, 2012)
and the reduction of credit to firms (Bentolila, Jansen, Jime´nez, and Ruano, 2013).
As happened to other countries of the Eurozone, Spain suffered a credit crunch during
the Great Recession. Access to credit was difficult, in particular for small and medium-
sized firms. For example, in the second half of 2011, almost 30% of the firms interviewed
in a study by the ECB (2014) reported that access to finance was the most pressing
problem.3 On the fiscal front, the recession eroded tax bases, also at the sub-national
level. As regional and local governments saw their fiscal revenues drop, they started to
fall behind on payments to suppliers. By December 2011, commercial debt in arrears by
regional and local governments had accumulated to 3% of GDP.
Commercial arrears by sub-national governments were financially constraining
suppliers. Because a majority of suppliers were local small and medium-sized
companies, in policy circles it was thought that financial constraints were negatively
affecting the real economy and employment (IMF, 2013). The Spanish central
government responded by passing legislation on February 24 and March 9, 2012 to pay
the commercial debt in arrears. It set up a new state-owned vehicle, the Fondo para la
Financiacio´n del Pago a Proveedores (FFPP).
The FFPP was tasked with making payments directly to suppliers who were owed money
by sub-national governments. These payments were made over a two-month period in
3We plot the evolution of this fraction over the period 2010–2014 in Figure 1.
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2012 and amounted to almost 3% of Spanish GDP.4 Legally, the stock of commercial
debt previously owed to suppliers turned into financial debt now owed to the FFPP.
Participation was mandatory for municipalities and voluntary for regional governments.
Three out of 17 regional governments (Basque Country, Galicia and Navarre) decided
not to participate in the program. In order to participate, regional governments had to
commit to a fiscal adjustment plan. Because they could not opt out of the repayment
scheme, municipalities were not required to commit to a fiscal adjustment plan although
they could voluntarily do so. If their adjustment plan was approved by the central
government, then they were given more favorable conditions on the debt owed to the
FFPP.
Funds used to pay suppliers were guaranteed by the share in national tax receipts of
each region and municipality. To repay debt to the FFPP, regions and municipalities
without an approved fiscal adjustment plan would have part of their share in national
taxes withheld over a 5-year period. On the other hand, if they secured approval of
a fiscal adjustment plan, then the money paid on their behalf could be financed at an
attractive interest rate with a 10-year loan, with a 2-year interest-only grace period. The
interest rate was set at the funding cost of the Spanish Treasury plus 115 basis points,
with an intermediation margin of 30 basis points. These were favorable conditions in
the context of 2012.
The FFPP obtained funds from a EUR 35bn syndicated loan granted by a pool Spanish
banks, including the state-owned ICO, which made the single largest contribution. This
syndicated loan was guaranteed by the Spanish government. From a national accounting
point of view, the liabilities of the FFPP became part of the stock of outstanding general
government debt.
The payment of commercial debt in arrears through the FFPP was unexpected: it
was not part of the electoral program of the Partido Popular (PP), which came into
power in the November 2011 general election. As such, it provides a quasi-experimental
setting to study the effect of relaxing financing constraints on employment variables.
The conception, communication, and execution of the program wholly took place in
2012. The first mention of this program in the press is an article in La Vanguardia in
4There were three payment dates: on May 28, EUR9.3bn were transferred to suppliers of
municipalities; on June 25, EUR17.7bn were transferred to suppliers of the 14 participating regions;
finally, on July 30, EUR 0.3bn were transferred to suppliers of municipalities that had been left out in
the May payment.
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January 2012. The legislation passed into law in February and March 2012. By July
2012, the program had been completed and the last invoices had been paid.
4 Data
4.1 Data Sources
Employment and unemployment data are obtained from the standard sources.
Employment is measured as the year-end number of workers by the Spanish Social
Security Administration. These data are maintained by the Ministry of Employment
and Social Security and contain all workers affiliated to the Social Security System and
by municipality and job classification on a monthly basis from 01/2003 onward.
The number of unemployed is the year-end number of people registered as unemployed
and counted as such by the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security. It
contains the number of registered unemployed by gender, age group, economic sector,
and municipality on a monthly basis from 05/2005 onward.
We use per-capita normalizations for employment and unemployment flows. We obtain
population counts from the Continuous Census of the National Statistics Institute (INE).
This data set contains the number of residents in a municipality broken up by gender
and age for all Spanish municipalities on a yearly basis.
Data on the FFPP were obtained from the Instituto de Cre´dito Oficial (ICO), the
state-owned bank that channeled the payments to the suppliers. These data include
anonymized information for firms accounting for 48.2% of all suppliers that benefited
from this measure (64,879 out of 134,568) and almost 70% of the funds injected by the
FFPP (19 out of 27.3 billion euros). The data set includes information on the number
and amount of invoices broken down by local government, the amounts seized by the
government due to unpaid taxes and social contributions and the dates in which the
payments took place. The difference between the amount of unpaid bills and the seized
amount equals the cash the firm effectively receives. Interestingly, the data set also
matches this information to to the ZIP code of firms that are paid.
The data set does not include information on 46,564 self-employed individuals (34.6%
of suppliers and 1.5% of funds), nor on 23,125 firms (17.2% of suppliers and 29% of
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funds) that were not available at the Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System (SABI), a
database with a coverage of more than 1.25 million firms in Spain which is provided by
INFORMA D&B in collaboration with Bureau Van Dijk.
Budget information on municipalities is obtained from the budget database of the
Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administration. This database contains the
annual budget of all Spanish municipalities for the years 2005 through 2014. Debt by
municipality is also obtained from the Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public
Administration and is available on a yearly basis from 2008 onward. The revenue of
the tax on economic activities (IAE) for each municipality is obtained from yearly
reports by the Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administration. These reports
contain economic activities tax revenues on a yearly basis from 2010 onward for all
municipalities with the exception of the Basque Country and Navarre.
4.2 Description of the Liquidity Shock
We normalize liquidity received by each municipality i in 2012 by the working-age
population of that municipality in 2011. Per-capita liquidity `i is defined as
`i =
Liquidity injection to municipality i in 2012
Population aged 15–64 in municipality i in 2011
. (1)
Figure 2 shows the per-capita size of shock by quartiles measured at the location of
the local administration that had the commercial debt. We call this the origin of the
liquidity shock. Figure 3 shows the per-capita size of shock by quartiles measured at the
location of the legal address of the supplier. We call this the destination of the shock.
At first sight, these figures show that the origin of the shock resembles the destination of
the shock. Geographically, there is a diagonal strip that passes North of Madrid where
the liquidity shock is weaker or non-existent. This corresponds to municipalities that
are very small in size and in population. One of the differences between the two figures
shows up when we turn to the destination of the liquidity shock. The destination of the
funds is more concentrated in large and populous areas compared to the origin of the
shock.
The first two columns in Tables 1 and 2 show the characteristics of municipalities that
received liquidity versus those that did not. Because municipalities that do not receive
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liquidity strongly differ in their characteristics from those that do (e.g., they are smaller
and less unpopulated), they are ill-suited for counterfactual experiments. Controlling for
the set of characteristics that are observed might be a questionable approach to overcome
selection bias because there are likely unobserved factors that cannot be accounted for
in this case. For this reason, we exclude municipalities with no exposure to the liquidity
shock from the analysis in what follows.
Next, we turn to the size of the liquidity injection. We classify all municipalities that
were exposed to a liquidity shock into two groups according to the magnitude of
per-capita liquidity they received. We set the threshold at the median, i.e., 50% of
municipalities fall into the low and high groups. The last two columns in Tables 1
and 2 compare the characteristics of municipalities that were exposed to a low versus a
high per-capita liquidity injection. Gaps in characteristics become smaller, often by an
order of magnitude, relative to the prior analysis that compared no-shock versus shock
municipalities. However, municipalities in the low and high groups still differ in some
dimensions. That is why in our later analysis we use matching on covariates to
construct a comparable control group.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (origin: municipality where funds are paid).
No Shock Shock Low High
Per-capita FFPP injection 0.00 527.17 132.31 922.44
(0.00) (854.68) (86.65) (1068.69)
Population 2650.00 9393.11 10085.54 8699.95
(27105.27) (62892.03) (36406.21) (81174.62)
Unemployment rate 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.12
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Employment rate 0.42 0.39 0.40 0.38
(0.35) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Fraction of population aged 15-64 0.60 0.63 0.64 0.63
(0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Percentage PSOE 0.29 0.35 0.35 0.35
(0.23) (0.19) (0.18) (0.20)
Percentage PP 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.38
(0.30) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23)
Percentage IU 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.04
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Per-capita IAE (EUR/N) 73.69 30.37 28.09 32.66
(365.27) (192.02) (89.90) (256.32)
Per-capita debt (EUR/N) 294.45 513.49 414.79 612.29
(717.72) (592.68) (471.29) (679.13)
Per-capita revenue (EUR/N) 2560.45 1938.81 1678.11 2200.48
(3166.87) (1428.03) (924.00) (1758.83)
Per-capita expenditure (EUR/N) 2501.77 1981.47 1701.21 2262.77
(2435.56) (1473.06) (936.25) (1819.66)
Observations 4326 3784 1892 1892
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Table 2: Summary Statistics (destination: municipality where firms are headquartered).
No Shock Shock Low High
Per-capita FFPP injection 0.00 158.26 13.43 303.18
(0.00) (678.50) (10.85) (937.62)
Population 757.29 12758.99 7618.61 17902.40
(2566.44) (72550.32) (18973.31) (100599.03)
Unemployment rate 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.12
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Employment rate 0.38 0.44 0.42 0.46
(0.30) (0.26) (0.24) (0.29)
Fraction of population aged 15-64 0.59 0.65 0.65 0.65
(0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Percentage PSOE 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.33
(0.24) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Percentage PP 0.43 0.36 0.35 0.37
(0.29) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21)
Percentage IU 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.05
(0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Per-capita IAE (EUR/N) 59.10 43.00 39.53 46.40
(288.66) (297.85) (148.81) (392.12)
Per-capita debt (EUR/N) 325.88 494.43 458.42 530.45
(727.72) (570.10) (504.28) (627.19)
Per-capita revenue (EUR/N) 2702.09 1674.52 1635.11 1713.96
(3155.50) (933.24) (796.59) (1051.13)
Per-capita expenditure (EUR/N) 2673.17 1687.32 1640.15 1734.52
(2504.43) (938.40) (775.39) (1075.26)
Observations 4705 3405 1703 1702
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5 Empirical Strategy
Our unit of observation is a municipality and we use yearly data for the years 2010–2014.
This gives us a 2-year window before and after the liquidity shock that occurred in 2012.
The effect on employment and unemployment (either through direct hiring or through
spillover effects) can be located either in the municipality that owed money to a firm
(where the money originates), or in the municipality where the firm has its headquarters
(the destination of the money). We therefore explore the effects on employment and
unemployment at both the origin and the destination of the funds.
In our main analysis we exclude municipalities that did not receive FFPP funds. The
reason is that municipalities that did not receive funds are very different from the rest
of the population. These differences fall into two categories. First, non-recipient
municipalities are typically small, sparsely populated, and rural. Thus, comparisons
between municipalities with positive liquidity shocks and a zero shock do not plausibly
lead to an effect that can be argued to be causal. Second, when focusing at the origin
of the money, municipalities from the Basque Country and Navarre were excluded from
participating in the FFPP because these two regions enjoy a special tax status. Any
effect derived from a comparison between municipalities within and outside these
regions cannot be disentangled from the special fiscal status.
In Section 4.2 we compare recipient to non-recipient municipalities to show how they
differ on certain dimensions, such as population, labor market variables, and fiscal
variables. Our results presented in Section 6 rely exclusively on municipalities exposed
to a positive liquidity shock. This population is more homogeneous and selection bias
is less of an issue. In any case, we go to great lengths to rule out selection bias and
other confounding factors.
5.1 Outcome variables
We use two different labor market measures: employment and unemployment. Our first
outcome variable consists of employment flows normalized by working-age population in
2011, the same variable we used to normalize the liquidity variable. Employment flows
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are constructed for each municipality i as
∆eit ≡ Ei,t − Ei,t−1
Ni,15−64
× 100, (2)
where Ei,t−1 and Ei,t are employment counts in two consecutive years and Ni,15−64 is
the working-age population in 2011, defined as the population aged between 15 and 64.
Likewise, letting Ui,t−1 and Ui,t denote the stock of unemployed in two consecutive years,
unemployment flows in a municipality are defined as
∆uit ≡ Ui,t − Ui,t−1
Ni,15−64
× 100. (3)
As we explain in Section 4.1, employment and unemployment counts are obtained from
public sources: two different datasets maintained by the Spanish Ministry of
Employment and Social Security. Population data are obtained from the Spanish
National Statistics Institute.5
5.2 Specification
5.2.1 Benchmark specification
We use i to index municipalities, t to index time, and yit ∈ {∆eit,∆uit} to refer to any of
the outcome variables of interest. Letting `i stand for the amount of per-capita liquidity
5As a robustness exercise, we experimented with a second way of measuring outcome variables
through the use of symmetric growth rates. The symmetric growth rate of employment is defined by
gEt ≡
Et − Et−1
1
2Et +
1
2Et−1
× 100 (4)
and the symmetric growth rate of unemployment is defined by
gUt ≡
Ut − Ut−1
1
2Ut +
1
2Ut−1
× 100. (5)
It can be shown from the definition that the symmetric growth rate is bounded in the range [−200, 200].
The symmetric growth rate is used mainly in the literature using establishment-level employment
microdata (see, e.g., Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh, 1998). It is a second-order approximation of
the log difference growth rate around zero. The symmetric growth rate’s main advantage over the usual
growth rate is that it is robust to the presence of outliers, which may pose problems in micro datasets.
All our results held for outcome variables measured in this way.
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received in 2012 under the FFPP program in municipality i, we estimate the parameter
λ in the regression:
yit = αi + λ`i × I{t>2012} + δt +Xitβ + εit, t 6= 2012. (6)
The interaction term λ`i × I{t>2012} captures the effect of interest. Time dummy
variables δt allow for arbitrary common time variation. Xit is a vector of time-varying
control variables that aim to capture heterogeneity in the evolution of employment and
unemployment across municipalities. In our main estimation we allow for
municipality-specific fixed effects αi and estimate this equation using the standard
fixed-effects within-estimator. We also experiment with a pooled-OLS estimation, i.e.,
one that imposes αi = α for all i. In this case, we add a term γ`i to the right hand side
of (6) and also increase the number of variables in Xit, which can contain variables
that are constant by municipality. In all estimations, we use panel-robust standard
errors.
Our standard set of control variables consists of population, budget variables at the
municipality level (per-capita income, per-capita expenditure and per-capita debt), and
the political landscape, measured as the number of assembly members (concejales) in
the local elections in 2007 and 2011 belonging to the three main political parties at the
time (PP, PSOE, IU). We also add an economic activity indicator, defined as per-capita
revenue of the economic activity tax (IAE) collected by municipalities. This variable is
commonly used as an indicator of economic activity at the municipal level, for example
in the influential yearly report by La Caixa.6
We include interaction terms between time dummies and dummies for regions (CCAA).
These interaction terms will capture any time-varying effects that are common by CCAA.
The reason for including these terms is that at the same time of the FFPP plan to
municipalities, there was similar plan designed for CCAA. In addition, because the
liquidity injection occurred during 2012 it is unclear whether this year is already affected
by the liquidity injection. We decided to exclude this year from our estimations in the
benchmark equation. However, as we show below, the year 2012 can be included in a
6In this report, La Caixa reports data only for the largest 3,245 municipalities out of a total of
roughly 8,100 municipalities in Spain. We therefore obtain IAE tax revenue by municipality directly
from yearly reports by the Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, as explained in our
section on data sources.
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more flexible model.
5.2.2 Flexible specification
Because we have two periods prior to the liquidity injection and two periods after it,
we can estimate a more flexible specification. As argued by Mora and Reggio (2012)
and Mora and Reggio (2015), there are advantages to replacing the dummy variable
indicating the period before and after the occurrence of the shock with a more flexible
specification. Their argument is made for binary treatment variables but the intuition
carries over to a our continuous variable measuring liquidity.
In the flexible specification the single interaction term λ`i × I{t>2012} in (6) is replaced
with four yearly interaction terms, so that the equation to be estimated becomes
yit = αi +
2014∑
τ=2011
λτ`i × I{t=τ} + δt +Xitβ + εit. (7)
Otherwise, we include the same controls as those of our benchmark specification.
Our interest in this specification lies in the estimation of the coefficients λ2011, λ2012,
λ2013, and λ2014 (the year 2010 is the excluded category). This flexible specification has
a number of advantages over the standard specification in (6). As argued by Mora and
Reggio (2012), our specification does not directly impose a common-trend assumption
on labor market variables before 2012. In fact, the flexible specification allows to test
whether the years 2010 and 2011 differ in terms of the evolution of labor market variables
by performing a simple t-test on the coefficient estimated for λ2011.
There are two additional advantages from the flexible model. The first advantage is that
the year 2012 can be included without having to decide whether it is affected by the
shock. The data are allowed to speak for themselves. The second advantage is that the
effect of the liquidity injection is not constrained to be constant over the whole treatment
period, i.e., this flexible model allows for the possibility that λ2013 6= λ2014.
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5.2.3 Binary specification
In addition to the continuous variable `i, we also estimate specifications of the form
yit = αi + λHI{`i∈LH} × I{t>2012} + δt +Xitβ + εit, t 6= 2012, (8)
and
yit = αi +
2014∑
τ=2011
λτHI{`i∈LH} × I{t=τ} + δt +Xitβ + εit, (9)
where I{`i∈LH} is an indicator of whether liquidity ` in municipality i belongs to a group
of high liquidity recipients. We considered different definitions of the group LH , such as
the top half of the sample, the top quartile, etc.
The drawback of this approach is that by transforming our variable of interest into
a discrete variable with broad categories the estimation may be losing precision. The
advantage of the approach is that we can use standard tools derived for binary treatment
variables to study whether heterogeneity in the covariate distribution is biasing the
estimated effect of the liquidity shock.
5.2.4 Matching on covariates
As highlighted by Imbens (2004), the estimation of average treatment effects is sensitive
to differences in the covariate distribution. The specifications of the form (8) and (9)
allow us to perform matching on covariates. We use propensity score matching to select
a single match for each of the municipalities in the high group LH . According to Imbens
and Wooldridge (2009), this leads to credible inference with the least bias, at the cost
of sacrificing some precision. Matching is done with replacement, so that the same
municipality outside of the high group LH can perform as a match for more than one
observation in the LH group. We match on covariates for the year 2010. As a general
rule, we use variables in levels and add their squares only if they improve the results of
the the matching algorithm
For our matching variables we used the logarithm of the population, budget variables,
and the per-capita tax on economic activity. In addition to these variables we also
included the geographical location of each municipality represented as the centroid of
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the 2-dimensional coordinates of each municipality on a map in geospatial vector data
format. As argued by Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) geographically-
matched controls greatly reduce the potential selection bias, especially in the presence
of heterogeneous effects. We found that matching for the destination of funds was
greatly improved by also adding the employment rate measured in 2010. The results of
the matching procedure can be seen in Section 8.5. Despite the reduced set of variables
that were used in the matching procedure, we observe that the match is very good for
the year 2010, and also for the year 2011.
We estimate the specification for the binary treatment variable in (8) and (9) for the
original sample and for the sample matched on covariates. Our estimations include the
same controls as those of our continuous variable specification.
6 Results
Our results using the empirical strategy laid out in Section 5 suggest that liquidity
provision had significant effects on unemployment and employment both at the origin
of the liquidity injection and at the destination of of liquidity. Our results are presented
in a series of tables shown in the Appendix. The main conclusion is that the effect on
unemployment is stronger at the origin than at the destination whereas the effect on
employment is stronger at the destination. Moreover, there is evidence indicating that
the effect on employment carries over into 2014 at the destination.
6.1 The fully flexible specification
The effect on unemployment is reported in two tables. Table 3 measures the liquidity
shock at the location where suppliers were owed the money, i.e., at municipalities that
had their invoices in arrears repaid through the FFPP program. Table 4 measures the
location at the destination of funds, the municipality where suppliers had their legal
address. Coefficients in columns 1 and 2 are multiplied by 1,000. Therefore, they
measure changes in the number of unemployed individuals per EUR 1,000 that flow into
a municipality.
We are most interested in the results of the continuous flexible specification (Column 2)
and the binary specification with the matched sample (Column 6). According to the
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continuous specification there is a significant effect on unemployment only at the origin
of funds. In fact, this effect is negative and significantly different from zero only in 2013.
At the destination there does not seem to be any effect in the continuous specification.
Things change in the binary specification (Column 4). These results for the whole
sample show a significantly negative effect on unemployment in 2013 and 2014, if the
location of the origin is considered. When we use the sample that is matched on
covariates (Column 6), the significance is reduced although point estimates remain
virtually unchanged.
The first look at unemployment in the fully flexible model suggests that the effect is
clearer at the origin of funds.
Notably, the coefficients on λ2011 are not significantly different from zero. We therefore
later fit a reduced model that imposes λ2010 = λ2011.
Before doing so, we turn to employment. Table 5 focuses on the origin and Table 6 on
the destination of funds.
The continuous specification (Column 2) shows significant positive effects on employment
in 2013 at the origin and in 2013 and 2014 at the destination. The estimation at the
origin also shows a large point estimate for 2012 which is not significantly different from
zero. The effect measured at the destination seems to be stronger and more persistent
than at the origin.
This overall result is maintained when we turn to the binary specification, although
significance is reduced. Focusing on the matched sample (Column 6), we find that at the
destination the matching procedure has eliminated the large and significant coefficient
on λ2011. Again, this is evidence in favor of a more parsimonious model in which λ2010 =
λ2011.
We now turn to a reduced model that imposes λ2010 = λ2011.
6.2 A flexible specification with λ2010 = λ2011
Results of imposing λ2010 = λ2011 are shown in Tables 7 through Tables 10. This
specification yields results that are qualitatively similar to those for the fully flexible
model. However, the precision with which the coefficients are estimated is larger.
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There are two main conclusions from these results. First, the evidence for a reduction
of unemployment is stronger at the origin whereas the evidence for an increase of
employment is stronger at the destination. Second, there are differences in timing.
Effects do not persist into 2014 in the same way at the origin and at the destination.
6.3 Robustness checks
We conducted several robustness checks. In addition to the fixed-effects specification, we
estimated all our equations using a pooled-OLS estimator (clustering standard errors by
municipality). We obtained results that were qualitatively similar although, in general,
with smaller estimated standard errors, and therefore higher statistical significance. In
this sense, our fixed-effects results are the more conservative choice.
We conducted several robustness checks on our matching procedure, as well. We changed
the caliper from our preferred value of 0.005 to smaller and larger values and obtained
overall similar results. We also explored using other variables in the matching procedure
but the use of groups of variables that delivered a fit comparable with our preferred case
delivered similar results.
7 Concluding Remarks
We find that the liquidity injection had effects both at originating and destination
municipalities. However, the size and timing of the effects are different. At the origin,
there was a strong reduction in 2013 that persists until 2014. At the destination, the
effect is weaker and concentrated in 2013. In comparison, the effect on employment
was stronger and more persistent at the destination.
Our preliminary findings suggest that the liquidity injection in 2012, and the elimination
of financial constraints it implied, had a plausibly causal effect on labor market outcomes.
Our results are a first step in attempting to study the effect of the FFPP program on
employment and unemployment. The objective is to obtain estimates that can be argued
to be of a causal nature. For this, further work is needed in order to weed out potential
selection bias.
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More generally, our findings address the effect of “financial frictions” and “financial
shocks” on employment that were brought to the highlight by the recent financial crisis,
and which are now routinely used in economic models. We do so by using micro data at
the municipality level. Our preliminary findings suggest that the strong effects on the
real economy predicted by economic theory are validated once the geographical origin
and destination of funds is considered.
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8 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Fraction of small and medium-sized firms in Spain mentioning access to finance
as the most pressing problem over the period 2010–2014 (constructed from the ECB series
SAFE.H.ES.SME.A.0.0.0.Q0.ZZZZ.P3.AL.WP)
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Figure 2: Per-capita size of shock by quartiles measured at the location of the local
administration that had the commercial debt (Origin). Canary Islands are not included to
preserve the scale.
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Figure 3: Per-capita size of shock by quartiles measured at the location of the legal address of
the supplier (Destination). Canary Islands are not included to preserve the scale.
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8.1 Results for Unemployment (Fixed Effects)
Table 3: Effect on ∆u (Origin).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Benchmark Flexible Binary Binary Flex Matched Matched Flex
λ≥2013 -0.104*
(0.059)
λ2011 -0.076
(0.098)
λ2012 -0.099
(0.082)
λ2013 -0.193**
(0.088)
λ2014 -0.103
(0.104)
λ≥2013H -0.182*** -0.210**
(0.058) (0.084)
λ2011H -0.129 -0.072
(0.107) (0.161)
λ2012H -0.134 -0.105
(0.097) (0.140)
λ2013H -0.264*** -0.260*
(0.096) (0.148)
λ2014H -0.240** -0.233
(0.097) (0.145)
Observations 14,671 18,339 14,671 18,339 13,995 17,494
R-squared 0.207 0.219 0.207 0.219 0.197 0.210
Number of id 3,668 3,668 3,668 3,668 2,685 2,685
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Table 4: Effect on ∆u (Destination).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Benchmark Flexible Binary Binary Flex Matched Matched Flex
λ≥2013 -0.043
(0.053)
λ2011 0.049
(0.086)
λ2012 0.077
(0.139)
λ2013 -0.118
(0.098)
λ2014 0.073
(0.115)
λ≥2013H -0.078* -0.138**
(0.047) (0.061)
λ2011H 0.023 0.073
(0.084) (0.105)
λ2012H -0.004 0.056
(0.077) (0.126)
λ2013H -0.025 -0.135
(0.076) (0.101)
λ2014H -0.109 -0.073
(0.074) (0.099)
Observations 13,087 16,359 13,087 16,359 12,824 16,030
R-squared 0.307 0.327 0.307 0.327 0.302 0.312
Number of id 3,272 3,272 3,272 3,272 2,453 2,453
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8.2 Results for Employment (Fixed Effects)
Table 5: Effect on ∆e (Origin).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Benchmark Flexible Binary Binary Flex Matched Matched Flex
λ≥2013 0.102
(0.093)
λ2011 0.180
(0.123)
λ2012 0.171
(0.116)
λ2013 0.232*
(0.126)
λ2014 0.161
(0.137)
λ≥2013H 0.166 0.208
(0.128) (0.173)
λ2011H -0.096 -0.098
(0.212) (0.277)
λ2012H 0.314 0.307
(0.206) (0.280)
λ2013H 0.331* 0.342
(0.196) (0.248)
λ2014H -0.080 -0.015
(0.183) (0.229)
Observations 14,605 18,257 14,605 18,257 13,915 17,401
R-squared 0.053 0.079 0.053 0.080 0.060 0.085
Number of id 3,660 3,661 3,660 3,661 2,680 2,681
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Table 6: Effect on ∆e (Destination).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Benchmark Flexible Binary Binary Flex Matched Matched Flex
λ≥2013 0.511**
(0.242)
λ2011 -0.044
(0.373)
λ2012 -0.232
(0.209)
λ2013 0.458**
(0.212)
λ2014 0.520**
(0.246)
λ≥2013H 0.357*** 0.460**
(0.126) (0.199)
λ2011H -0.494** -0.174
(0.206) (0.248)
λ2012H -0.199 0.176
(0.225) (0.294)
λ2013H -0.166 0.334
(0.199) (0.264)
λ2014H 0.386** 0.412*
(0.190) (0.249)
Observations 13,065 16,330 13,065 16,330 12,821 16,026
R-squared 0.074 0.101 0.073 0.100 0.084 0.116
Number of id 3,270 3,270 3,270 3,270 2,453 2,453
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8.3 Results for Unemployment (Fixed Effects, λ2010 = λ2011)
Table 7: Effect on ∆u (Origin).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Benchmark Flexible Matched Matched Flex
λ≥2013 -0.104*
(0.059)
λ2012 -0.061
(0.058)
λ2013 -0.155**
(0.062)
λ2014 -0.064
(0.074)
λ≥2013H -0.210**
(0.084)
λ2012H -0.069
(0.112)
λ2013H -0.224*
(0.117)
λ2014H -0.198*
(0.111)
Observations 14,671 18,339 13,995 17,494
R-squared 0.207 0.219 0.197 0.210
Number of id 3,668 3,668 2,685 2,685
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Table 8: Effect on ∆u (Destination).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Benchmark Flexible Matched Matched Flex
λ≥2013 -0.043
(0.053)
λ2012 0.053
(0.122)
λ2013 -0.142
(0.097)
λ2014 0.049
(0.085)
λ≥2013H -0.138**
(0.061)
λ2012H 0.020
(0.118)
λ2013H -0.171**
(0.085)
λ2014H -0.109
(0.090)
Observations 13,087 16,359 12,824 16,030
R-squared 0.307 0.327 0.302 0.312
Number of id 3,272 3,272 2,453 2,453
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8.4 Results for Employment (Fixed Effects, λ2010 = λ2011)
Table 9: Effect on ∆e (Origin).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Benchmark Flexible Matched Matched Flex
λ≥2013 0.102
(0.093)
λ2012 0.081
(0.099)
λ2013 0.142
(0.107)
λ2014 0.071
(0.111)
λ≥2013H 0.208
(0.173)
λ2012H 0.356
(0.250)
λ2013H 0.391*
(0.218)
λ2014H 0.034
(0.198)
Observations 14,605 18,257 13,915 17,401
R-squared 0.053 0.079 0.060 0.085
Number of id 3,660 3,661 2,680 2,681
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Table 10: Effect on ∆e (Destination).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Benchmark Flexible Matched Matched Flex
λ≥2013 0.511**
(0.242)
λ2012 -0.210
(0.236)
λ2013 0.481**
(0.200)
λ2014 0.542*
(0.325)
λ≥2013H 0.460**
(0.199)
λ2012H 0.263
(0.256)
λ2013H 0.421*
(0.238)
λ2014H 0.499**
(0.217)
Observations 13,065 16,330 12,821 16,026
R-squared 0.074 0.101 0.084 0.116
Number of id 3,270 3,270 2,453 2,453
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8.5 Quality of the matching procedure
Table 11: Quality of the match in 2010 (Origin)
Low (U) High (U) Low (M) High (M)
X coordinate 0.46 0.52 0.54 0.52
(0.32) (0.28) (0.33) (0.28)
Y coordinate 4.43 4.42 4.41 4.42
(0.28) (0.24) (0.27) (0.24)
Population 10054.49 9186.97 10842.75 9333.35
(36420.56) (83762.62) (38656.84) (84563.89)
Unemployment rate 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Employment rate 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.37
(0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.18)
Fraction of population aged 15-64 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.69
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Percentage PSOE 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.35
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Percentage PP 0.38 0.37 0.35 0.37
(0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22)
Percentage IU 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Per-capita IAE (EUR/N) 24.85 30.44 30.67 27.42
(76.46) (233.33) (90.91) (212.54)
Per-capita debt (EUR/N) 386.99 581.12 538.24 546.21
(458.65) (621.33) (534.77) (545.14)
Per-capita revenue (EUR/N) 1870.70 2249.49 2164.13 2191.76
(1176.63) (1478.85) (1447.96) (1350.39)
Per-capita expenditure (EUR/N) 1848.50 2229.28 2135.79 2177.64
(1143.76) (1409.99) (1405.68) (1309.01)
Observations 1892 1784 936 1750
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Table 12: Quality of the match in 2011 (Origin)
Low (U) High (U) Low (M) High (M)
X coordinate 0.46 0.52 0.54 0.52
(0.32) (0.28) (0.33) (0.28)
Y coordinate 4.43 4.42 4.41 4.42
(0.28) (0.24) (0.27) (0.24)
Population 10085.54 9218.34 10891.67 9364.78
(36406.21) (83546.39) (38663.79) (84345.44)
Unemployment rate 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Employment rate 0.40 0.39 0.41 0.39
(0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19)
Fraction of population aged 15-64 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.63
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Percentage PSOE 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.35
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Percentage PP 0.38 0.37 0.35 0.37
(0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22)
Percentage IU 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Per-capita IAE (EUR/N) 28.09 34.28 33.89 31.24
(89.90) (263.78) (102.59) (245.31)
Per-capita debt (EUR/N) 414.79 622.12 568.97 587.81
(471.29) (645.67) (537.78) (571.68)
Per-capita revenue (EUR/N) 1678.11 2022.59 1827.10 1989.77
(924.00) (1277.59) (961.62) (1236.53)
Per-capita expenditure (EUR/N) 1701.21 2068.49 1858.45 2028.51
(936.25) (1292.66) (994.25) (1233.49)
Observations 1893 1784 936 1750
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Table 13: Quality of the match in 2010 (Destination)
Low (U) High (U) Low (M) High (M)
X coordinate 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.48
(0.34) (0.31) (0.39) (0.31)
Y coordinate 4.47 4.41 4.41 4.41
(0.28) (0.28) (0.33) (0.28)
Population 7585.60 18128.60 11653.83 10142.93
(18933.18) (101587.07) (25638.01) (21029.69)
Unemployment rate 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Employment rate 0.40 0.44 0.42 0.42
(0.22) (0.28) (0.19) (0.20)
Fraction of population aged 15-64 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Percentage PSOE 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
Percentage PP 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.37
(0.22) (0.20) (0.22) (0.20)
Percentage IU 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Per-capita IAE (EUR/N) 34.61 39.82 28.40 30.21
(138.11) (359.90) (53.88) (93.19)
Per-capita debt (EUR/N) 429.78 501.32 436.17 490.19
(469.10) (605.67) (435.17) (598.74)
Per-capita revenue (EUR/N) 1791.45 1861.00 1826.57 1859.84
(906.36) (1141.90) (1021.59) (1143.65)
Per-capita expenditure (EUR/N) 1759.01 1853.52 1783.38 1853.84
(865.34) (1101.19) (990.05) (1105.94)
Observations 1703 1676 851 1605
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Table 14: Quality of the match in 2011 (Destination)
Low (U) High (U) Low (M) High (M)
X coordinate 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.48
(0.34) (0.31) (0.39) (0.31)
Y coordinate 4.47 4.41 4.41 4.41
(0.28) (0.28) (0.33) (0.28)
Population 7618.61 18179.21 11722.78 10204.00
(18973.31) (101352.04) (25756.65) (21109.32)
Unemployment rate 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Employment rate 0.42 0.46 0.44 0.44
(0.24) (0.29) (0.21) (0.21)
Fraction of population aged 15-64 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Percentage PSOE 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
Percentage PP 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.37
(0.22) (0.20) (0.22) (0.20)
Percentage IU 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Per-capita IAE (EUR/N) 39.53 46.31 33.46 36.36
(148.81) (394.28) (81.33) (152.50)
Per-capita debt (EUR/N) 458.42 537.39 466.15 526.67
(504.28) (628.61) (462.50) (622.23)
Per-capita revenue (EUR/N) 1635.11 1687.43 1655.26 1686.30
(796.59) (968.81) (782.98) (972.89)
Per-capita expenditure (EUR/N) 1640.15 1701.24 1660.46 1696.27
(775.39) (937.32) (751.41) (933.42)
Observations 1703 1676 851 1605
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